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ABSTRACT
The number of severe computer security breaches in e-commerce applications has been on the
increase over the last few years. This has become one of the biggest security problems in recent
years. Although there are tools to build e-commerce application firewalls to alert and prevent
intruder attacks, these tools are not trivial to install (they are not plug-and-play). Internet
intruders can create havoc and produce catastrophe results by exploiting weaknesses in ecommerce applications. Therefore, developers of e-commerce web sites have to incorporate
ways to systematically identify and eliminate vulnerabilities in the EC applications to enhance
their security. This paper describes how Microsoft ASP.Net can be used to assist students in
exploring ways to increase the security of EC applications.

INTRODUCTION
Over the past few years, Eleetronic Commerce (EC) has allowed organizations to enhance their
economic growth, reduce barriers of market entry, improve efficiency and effectiveness, keep
inventories lean, and reduce costs (Hof and Hamm, 2002; Madden and Coble-Neal, 2002). In
fact, many consumers have found benefit in using the Intemet for EC: convenience, more
choices for products and services, vast amounts of information, and time savings. Customers are
not going to let a poor economy stop them from taking advantage of the Intemet for electronic
commerce. More than 200 millions American who now have Web access are likely to spend
more than $120 billon online this year (Economist, 2004). Business to business (B2B) online
transactions now stand at more than $2.6 trillion in the US, which is double the original estimate
for 2003. In addition, it is predicted that business to consumer (B2C) spending will exceed $250
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billion by 2005 (Mullaney, Green, Amdt, and Hof, 2003). There is no doubt that E-Commerce
will continue to grow that will change every kind of business, online as well as offline.
In order to achieve this bullish forecast, businesses need to build security into their EC web sites.
Without security, customers will shy away from the electronic shopping mall and refuse to
provide their personal and financial information needed for successful online transactions.
According to a recent survey conducted by the Computer Security Institute (CSI), security is the
top concem when conducting e-commerce activities on the web. Ninety percent of respondents,
mainly from large U.S. corporations and govemment agencies, detected computer security
breaches within the twelve month period ending in 2002 (The 2002 Computer Security Institute
(CSI) report). Eighty percent of those security breaches resulted in substantial financial losses.
From a business perspective, EC web site security can be divided into three categories: network,
web server, and application security (Microsoft, 2004). The foregoing survey cited web
coimection and application as frequent points of attack. This paper describes a teaching case that
emphasizes methods students can use to enhance e-commerce application security and examine
ways to improve application robustness by integrating many security features within the design
process.
Indeed, the number of severe computer security breaches of e-commerce applications has grown
steadily and is now seen as one of the biggest security problems in recent years. Although there
are tools to build e-commerce application firewalls to alert when an attack happens and/or
prevent attacks, these tools are not trivial to install. Intemet intruders can create havoc and
produce catastrophe results by exploiting weaknesses within e-commerce applications (McClure
and Scambrary, 1999). The intruder's best ally is poorly written or inadequately tested software.
Unfortunately, many developers neglect this area and distribute applications containing
exploitable bugs (Franklin and Wiens, 2004). Therefore, developers for EC web sites have to
incorporate ways to systematically identify and eliminate vulnerabilities in the code for EC
applications to enhance their security.

THE PROJECT OF SECURING E-COMMERCE APPLICATIONS
A semester long e-commerce course that one author taught in the spring 2004 at a large midwestern university included web-based application design that allowed students to use Microsoft
ASP.Net to explore the EC application development process by creating an electronic shopping
mall to sell a variety of products. The students, who were seniors with an Information Systems
major, covered a range of e-commerce development topics, including site design, shopping cart
design, input validation, web database integration, order confirmation, and incorporating security
features.
The project of integrating security features into an e-commerce site was developed based on the
three phases of marketing activities: pre-sales, sales, and after-sales (Liu, Amett, Capella, and
Beatty, 1997). Any EC activities fit within these three classifications. The pre-sales phase
includes a company's efforts to attract customers by advertising, public relations, feasible
site/key phrase search, new product or service announcements, and other related activities.
Customers' electronic purchasing activities occur in the online phase where orders and charges
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are placed electronically through the web. Of course, off-line orders and charges, such as those
jfrom a mail or telephone medium, are also permitted. The after-sales phase includes customer
service, problem resolution, and other issues such as handling product defects and returns and
follow-up surveys to maintain or generate customer satisfaction.

SECURITY IN PRE'SALES PHASE
When discussing how to build security in the pre-sales phase of an e-commerce web site,
emphasis was given on how to prevent unexpected errors, thus building robustness into the site
to increase customers' trust level and confidence while browsing the site.
There is no doubt that errors will occur in e-commerce applications. Students, and even
professional web developers, generally try to trap errors using a facility called TRY-CATCH
statement blocks when using ASP.Net. However, this technique does not handle every possible
exception. For example, when a customer tries to access a non-existent page from a site
developed with ASP.Net, he or she would see a typical error message as displayed in Figure 1.
Moreover, if an unexpected error occurs, the error message as displayed in Figure 2 could reveal
information which includes the business logic behind the site design. Obviously, it is quite
dangerous for a business organization since it can give intruders more information to use in
trying to crash the application, or gain access to sensitive information, and/or execute malicious
code.
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Figure 1: ERROR MESSAGE for SEARCHING UNAVAILABLE PAGE
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Figure 2: AN EXAMPLE OF AN ERROR MESSAGE FOR AN UNEXPECTED
EXCEPTION
In the course, three different methods were examined to handle unexpected exceptions using
ASP.Net: (1) using a feature called customerErrors section within the Web.Config file
(Web.Config is the overall configuration file for a web-based application or a portion of the webbased application), (2) using a subroutine CSMQA Application_Error within the Global.asax file
(Global.asax handles the web environment for a web-based application), and (3) implementing a
Page Error subroutine within a given page. This paper demonstrates how the authors taught
error handling by using customerErrors within the Web.Config file.
The Web.Config file is written in XML (extensible Markup Language) format. XML is a
relatively new markup language that provides a cross-platform method that can identify, or
markup data. An XML document allows for complete control over the structure of the data.
Subsequently, one needs only to define tags or elements within the document or tile to explain
the meaning of the data. Therefore before the Web. Config tile was examined and modified, the
authors taught the students the basics of XML and how to create an XML tile to represent a data
structure. This emphasized the popularity of XML stems from its ability to separate content with
presentation, whereby the developer has the freedom to build an application having its own data
structure.
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The examination and modification of the Web.Config file was then explained. It was explained
how to handle specific errors based on the error code (such as 403, 404, 500, etc.), or use one
page to handle all errors. Figure 3 how to modify the Web.Config file by enabling mode = "On"
in the customErrors section, shows how specific errors are handled such as error 403 which is
handled by redirecting to the "authorization failed page", and handling imexpected errors by
specifying a default redirection page. Figure 4 presents an example of a pre-defined error
handling page.
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Figure 3: THE WEB.CONFIG FILE FOR ERROR HANDLING
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Figure 4: A PRE-DEFINED ERROR HANDLING PAGE
The above example demonstrates using the Web.Config file in an ASP.Net application to ensure
all the unexpected errors will be handled in a certain way to increase the security of the site and
the robustness of the pre-sales phase of the e-commerce application. These measures will
increase customers trust and confidence while browsing the web site.

SECURITY IN ONLINE SALES PHASE
In the online sales phase the customers use the EC application to accomplish one or more
electronic data transactions. The emphasis of the security design within this phrase is to
demonstrate how to protect personal customer information being passed across the Internet using
encryption. When customers submit their financial and personal information at an e-commerce
web site, the data is transmitted from a browser to the company's web server. As the data moves
through the Internet, in could be intercepted and read by unauthorized persons. The proper
solution is to encrypt the data before it is sent through the Intemet. Using encryption, even if the
data is captured, the information is protected.
The authors explained how the Secure Socket Layer (SSL) could be used to encrypt sensitive
information that would be passed back and forth between a web server and web browser. Since
this course dealt with application design, the authors presented the installation process to install
the Certificate Services in Microsoft Windows 2003 Server, generate a Certificate Request file.
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issue a Certificate, and then install a server-side Certificate by using Microsoft Intemet
Information Manager.
Figure 5 shows how after the server is configured to use SSL, the normal standardized http://
address will no longer work to access the page. Any request for the page is now using a secure
connection by using https:// instead of http:// as shown in Figure 6. Figure 6 shows information
such as credit card number, customer name, and email address that can be securely collected by
the EC application using SSL. Using https is obviously helpful for building trust because more
informed consumers would notice and care about the protection on their personal information.
Building security in the online sales phase is critical for all businesses. According to Hoffman
and Novak (1999), the primary reason many people have yet to shop online is the fundamental
lack of trust in the security and robustness of web sites. Almost 95% of the Web users surveyed
in the US have declined to provide personal information over the Intemet. Moreover, 40%
responded that they tend to create fake personal information when online. It appears that many
customers simply do not trust Web sites enough to engage in "relationship exchanges" that
involve the exchange of personal and financial information.
In addition, research has shown an increasing level of concem about privacy (Liu, Marchewka,
and Ku, 2004). Obviously this concem will become even more heightened as more customers
engage in e-commerce activities which collect personal and financial information. According to
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), protecting consumer's privacy is an important aspect of
ensuring data security in the online sales e-commerce activities (FTC Congress Report, 2000).
To emphasize the importance of trast policies the authors asked the students to research and
write their own privacy policies that they felt could ease customers' concems about online
privacy,. The class was also asked to explore several seal programs such as TRUSTe
(http://www.tmste.org/), BBBOnLine (http://www.bbbonline.org/), Verisign
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(http://www.verisign.com), and CyberTrust (http://www.cybertrust.gte.com). They found that the
seal programs require their licensees to abide by posted privacy and security policies and various
types of compliance monitoring in order to display a seal of trust on their web sites. They also
foxmd that the use of seals represents an industry-wide effort to use self-enforcement
mechanisms to make the Internet a safe and comfortable forum for customers to exchange
accurate information and conduct online transactions. The above were important features that
have to be incorporated into the security design for the online sales phase.
Encryption methods were also explained. These included using .Net encryption classes to
encrypt sensitive information. Encryption refers to the process by which data is transformed into
a format that is unreadable. The intended recipients, however, have the necessary keys to unlock
the format (Mackey, 2003). Encryption offers four major services to protect data: confidentiality,
integrity, authenticity, and non-repudiation. Confidentiality is the protection of data. Integrity is
the ability to ensure that data is not modified by unauthorized persons. Authenticity is the
validation of the identity of the sender. Finally, the ability to provide non-repudiation ensures
that the sender cannot deny sending the message.
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Obviously, using encryption can enhance the security build up for an e-commerce application.
One method was to use Hash algorithms to encrypt credit card information before it was passed
from the browser to the server and then decrypted before it was stored in a database table. By
using methods such as the above, the students demonstrated how to ensure data security in the
online sales phase of ecommerce activities.

SECURITY IN AFTER-SALES PHASE
The focus of the security design for the after-sales function in an e-commerce application is on
providing customers secure access to the data collected froni and about them. It was
demonstrated that the application should allow customers to view and update /correct/delete their
personal and financial information submitted to the business site.
Most often, application designers would create a login page as shown in Figure 7 to verify a
user's identify against a backend user database table. Using ADO.Net database access from
within ASP.Net, it was demonstrated that one could easily drag the database connection to the
login page and then incorporate structured query language (SQL) queries to authenticate a user
using the information stored in the backend database. Figure 8 shows the code associated with
the login button displayed in the login page displayed in Figure 7.
Once the students could successfully implement the login page, and verification, the authors
introduced a technique that intruders could use to access £ind compromise the backend database.
The technique is called SQL Injection. In this type of attack the intruder attempts to pass
malicious SQL code into the application in an attempt to determine rights, passwords or
information about the data and structure of the backend database. This malicious code is
typically appended to the legitimate SQL statement contained within the application. This can
cause the malicious SQL code to be executed against the database, so the intruder can get
additional information needed to gain more access into the backend database or to be granted
complete access to the database because the SQL command was altered through the injected
SQL code. For example, the students were required to conduct an anatomy of a SQL Injection
Attack hy typing the following in the user name textbox of the login page as shown in Figure 7:
' or 1=1; insert into userlist values('hacker', 'hacker') - -
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Figure 9: A SOLUTION OF USING STORED PROCEDURE FOR INJECTION
ATTACK
This demonstrated that the intruder could insert any data into the database and also remove
existing user information by issuing a delete command, or change an existing user's password by
using an update command. Students were shocked that they could even delete an entire table
within the database by using the drop command.
After the students understood how SQL Injection Attacks were produced, the authors then
demonstrated several solutions to avoid these security beaches. These included adding
validation controls to the input textboxes to verify user input by constraining certain characters
including
-", and requiring queries to be implemented as a SQL stored procedure instead of
using the input textboxes to dynamically generate a SQL query. Figure 9 shows an
implementation of the stored procedure technique replaces a dynamically generated SQL
command. This drastically decreases the vulnerability to SQL Injection Attacks.
Another technique demonstrated was to use separate Web.Config files in subdirectories of an EC
application. These Web.Conjig files were used to limit user access to ensure security in the aftersales phrase of the e-commerce activities. A scenario was developed in which one had to create a
MemberOnly directory within their EC application to serve returning customers in the after-sales
phase of an e-commerce activity. The MemberOnly directory has two subdirectories: Direetoryl
and Directory 2. Each directory has its own authorization rules declared in the Web.Config file
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residing in that directory. Figure 10 shows how by specif5dng the Form-based authentication this
can be accomplished. Using Figure 10 users "sam" and "jeff can gain access but no one else can
gain access to the portion of the EC application in the subdirectory. Therefore, access is
determined by your identity.
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Figure 10: An Example of Authorization in Sub-Directories

CONCLUSIONS
In today's ecommerce, business web sites gather personal and financial information about their
customers in order to gain competitive advantages. However, it appears to be imperative that the
web site ensmes that security concerns are adequately addressed.
Figure 11 is an application security model that the author proposed in the course to guide the
students to build security into the three stages of e-commerce activities. Based on relevant
literature review, this paper shows a teaching case that demonstrates many of the methods used
in handling security issues for an EC application. In the teaching case all methods were
implemented using the Microsoft ASP.Net development system. Using the three phases of
marketing: During Pre-Sales: techniques used include anticipating errors and handling them
appropriately. During the Online-Sales phase: methods used include validating input, creating
secure data coimections, using data encryption and implementing privacy seal and protection.
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During the After-Sales phase: methods used include implementing authentication, authorization
and avoiding vulnerabilities.

Figure 31. SECURITY FOR EC APPLICATION MODEL USING THE THREE PHASES
OF MARKETING
Using the Security for EC Application model each method was developed into an exercise for
the students. Each exercise included allowing the student to see the problem and implement the
method to protect against or correct the security issue. The students walked away surprised at
the many security issues involved and excited that they could protect against these security
vulnerabilities. One student even went to another faculty to let them know that there was
vulnerability in an online product the faculty was using. Overall, the students had a good
feedback which reflected on the teaching evaluation at the end of the semester on those materials
covered in class.
The authors definitely feel that both the students and the authors benefited from using the
teaching case. They plan to expand the teaching case to incorporate more methods and to
implement them both in ASP.NET and PHP.
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